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EVIDENCE-THE USE OF PRIOR UNCOUNSELED
CONVICTIONS FOR IMPEACHMENT
Appellant Loper was arrested and convicted in 1947 on a charge of
statutory rape of his eight-year old step-daughter. The alleged victim
was the sole witness for the prosecution. Loper, the only witness for the
defense, testified he had not committed the crime. The prosecution,
in an effort to impeach Loper's testimony, established on cross-ex-
amination of Loper that he had been convicted of four previous felonies
in the states of Mississippi and Tennessee. The jury found Loper guilty
as charged and sentenced him to 50 years in the state penitentiary.
Loper petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. At the habeas corpus
proceeding, Loper testified that he did not know of and was not informed
of his right to counsel and, in fact, was not represented by counsel at any of
the four felony trials relied upon by the prosecution to impeach his testi-
mony at the trial which led to his statutory rape conviction. In an unre-
ported decision, the district court denied Loper's petition for habeas corpus
relief and this decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.' On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the use of uncounseled
prior convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility deprives him of
due process of law. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 482 (1972).
The purpose of this note is to provide an historical analysis of signifi-
cant cases leading up to the Loper decision, and to discern the impact of
the case on the area of law concerned with the impeachment of a defend-
ant-witness' testimony.
From the common law rule which renders a person incompetent to
testify if that person had previously been convicted of an "infamous"
crime2 has evolved the modern day impeachment rationale; to wit: "that
those with prior convictions are likely to commit perjury because they fear
the effect the prior conviction will have on their sentence should they be
1. Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 43 (1954). "In-
famous" crime convictions include those for treason or any other felony, or mis-
demeanors involving dishonesty or the obstruction of justice. This common law rule
has been abolished by nearly all jurisdictions as it relates to preventing a witness




convicted again.' 3  This rationale was directly attacked on a very prag-
matic basis in Brown v. United States: 4
The reason for exposing the defendant's prior record is to attack his character, to
call into question his reliability for truth-telling by showing his prior, relevant anti-
social conduct. One need not look for prior conviction to find motivation to falsify,
for certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant has a
prior record. What greater incentive is there than the avoidance of conviction? 5
Under what circumstances a prosecutor may use the prior uncounseled
convictions of a defendant-witness to impeach his testimony has been
the subject of both dispute and confusion in recent years.
The American Jury,6 a book based on a University of Chicago Law
School study, evidences the prejudicial effect the introduction of prior
convictions has on the jury. One aspect of the study correlates the rate
of conviction with the jury's knowledge of a defendant's prior conviction.
The often-cited results of the study were as follows: in those cases where
the jury knew the defendant had been previously convicted of a crime,
the defendant was convicted 62 percent of the time, while in those cases
where the defendant had no criminal record (or if he did, the jury was not
aware of it) the rate of conviction dropped to 35 percent. 7 Those who
would allow the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment pur-
poses, while admitting that certain injustices may occur by focusing the
jury's attention on the defendant's prior convictions rather than on the
case at hand, contend that the court's instructions direct the jury to con-
sider the evidence only in terms of the defendant's credibility and to
ignore the evidence when considering the defendant's guilt. In Delli
Paoli v. United States s the Court stated:
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law to the jury
and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds them. Unless we
proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions ... the jury
system makes little sense. 9
Whether the jury system "makes little sense" or not, Mr. Justice Jackson
has stated: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be over-
come by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction."'10
3. Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4. Id. at 242.
5. Id. at 244.
6. H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
7. Id. at 160.
8. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
9. Id. at 242.
10. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion);
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Thus recognizing the practical effect that one or more convictions will
have as impeachment evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding, rep-
resentation by competent legal counsel at those earlier trials becomes all
the more significant. In Gideon v. Wainwright," the Supreme Court of
the United States posited a simple constitutional rule: in the absence of
a valid waiver, the right of an indigent defendant to have the assistance of
counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial, and a conviction
without the assistance of counsel violates the sixth amendment as applied
to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Black said, "[I]n
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him."'12
The constitutional rule announced in Gideon has been given retroactive
application.'- This retroactivity was inevitable since the Supreme Court
has said that the right to counsel goes to "the very integrity of the fact-
finding process" in criminal trials, and that a conviction of a defendant
who is denied the right of counsel at the trial lacks "reliability.' 4  In
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,15 the Supreme Court further elab-
orated on this theme when it said:
The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth, and it is self-evident that
to deny a lawyer's help through the technical intricacies of a criminal trial . . . is
to impede that purpose and to infect a criminal proceeding with the clear danger of
convicting the innocent.' 6
The essential question then raised was the significance of the Gideon
principle with respect to other aspects of the criminal proceeding where an
uncounseled prior conviction may have an impact.
accord, United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (limiting
instruction is a judicial placebo).
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In
Betts, the petitioner was indicted for robbery in Maryland. Financially unable
to afford his own counsel, petitioner requested that the court appoint counsel for
him. The request was denied, after which the petitioner, defending himself, was
convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison. Betts filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. In
denying the habeas corpus relief, the court held: "It is not necessary that in every
case, whatever the circumstances, one who is unable to obtain counsel must be
furnished counsel by the State." Betts v. Brady, supra, at 462.
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
13. Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
(1967); Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375
U.S. 2 (1963).
14. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 & n.20 (1965).
15. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
16. Id. at 416.
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In Burgett v. Texas,17 the prosecution offered evidence that the petitioner
had been convicted of four prior felonies, once in Texas for burglary, and
three times in Tennessee for forgery. It appeared that the petitioner had
not been represented by counsel in at least one of the prior convictions.
The petitioner was convicted and he appealed. In reversing the Texas
judgment the Court stated:
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used
against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense
. . . is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior
conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew
from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right. 18
Thus, the Court expressed in broad terms the areas in which evidence of
prior uncounseled convictions could not be introduced. The Court's con-
cern with preventing judicial limitations from being put on the Gideon
rule was evident, and yet, the Court did not speak directly to the issue
of whether prior uncounseled convictions could be used to impeach a
defendant-witness' testimony. The result was that in the few years
following Burgett, the permissible use of convictions, invalid under the
Gideon rule, to impeach a defendant-witness' credibility received divided
support in both the federal system and in the state courts.
In Gilday v. Scafati,' 9 for example, the petitioner was convicted of
armed robbery. During the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of
five prior felony convictions to impeach the defendant's testimony. At
three of these trials the defendant did not have the assistance of counsel.
In affirming the district court's decision to grant the defendant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, the first circuit held:
mhe Burgett rule against use of uncounseled convictions 'to prove guilt' was in-
tended to prohibit their use 'to impeach credibility,' for the obvious purpose and
likely effect of impeaching the defendant's credibility is to imply, if not prove, guilt.
Even if such prohibition was not originally contemplated, we fail to discern any
distinction which would allow such invalid convictions to be used to impeach credi-
bility. The absence of counsel impairs the reliability of such convictions just as
much when used to impeach as when used as direct proof of guilt. Moreover, such
use compounds the original denial of the constitutional right just as surely as does
use 'to prove guilt or enhance punishment.' 20
Furthermore, Gilday went on to apply retroactively the constitutional
safeguards established in Burgett,21 in accordance with the factors relevant
17. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
18. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
19. 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
20. Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
21. See also Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd
404 U.S. 443 (1972); Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1969); Losieau
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to the question of retroactivity as reiterated in Desist v. United States. 22
Nevertheless, the first circuit went on to conclude that the introduction
of prior convictions, under the facts of the case, was " 'harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt' "23 under the doctrine established in Chapman
v. California.24 The "harmless error" conclusion, however, did not lessen
the impact of its holding regarding the use of uncounseled prior con-
victions. The position of the first circuit was clear.
Upon substantially the same facts as in Gilday, the ninth circuit
reached a similar result in Tucker v. United States.25  Citing the Gilday
decision, the court stated: "The Burgett rule against the use of un-
counseled convictions to prove guilt or enhance punishment precludes
the use of such evidence to impeach a defendant's credibility as a wit-
ness."' 26 Also, as in Gilday, the court concluded that the reception of the
v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 988 (1969); Williams
v. Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968).
22. 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969). Essentially, the Court in Desist enumerated three
principles to be considered when retroactive application is at issue: "The criteria
guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards."
See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1965).
The Court in Gilday then said: "Obviously the purpose of Burgett was to pre-
vent the use of possibly unreliable convictions obtained at a trial whose fairness is
constitutionally suspect. Secondly, while there had undoubtedly been reliance on
a different rule, the importance of counsel at a criminal trial had been recognized
in the 1930's and established in 1963 . . . [see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).]-a relevant factor in assessing retroactivity. . . . Thirdly, . . . the
Court has observed that even a significant impact must be accepted 'when the issue
of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined.'" 428 F.2d 1027,
1030 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
23. Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, 1032 (Ist Cir. 1970). This conclusion was
based on the fact that three witnesses positively identified Gilday as one of the
robbers, and the petitioner's own testimony was damaging. Further, Gilday's testi-
mony was also attacked by the proper admission of two more recent felony con-
victions. See also Howard v. Craven, 466 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971).
24. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Court was urged by the petitioner
to hold that all federal constitutional errors must always be deemed harmful . . .
a holding which would require automatic reversal of convictions. Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, said: "We decline to adopt any such rule ...
[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are
so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitu-
tion, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."
Chapman v. California, supra at 22. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1965).
25. 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
26. Id. at 1293.
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prior convictions may, under certain circumstances, be "harmless error. ' 27
The important aspect of Tucker revolved around the fact that in
addition to allowing the prior convictions to impeach Tucker's testimony,
the trial judge, after the verdict, requested information from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation concerning the uncounseled prior convictions
for use in determining the defendant's sentence. In affirming the con-
viction, but remanding the case to the district court for resentencing without
consideration of the uncounseled prior convictions, the court held that
allowing the invalid convictions was not harmless error regarding the de-
fendant's sentence. The court stated: "There is a reasonable probability
that the defective prior convictions may have led the trial court to impose
a heavier prison sentence than it otherwise would have imposed. '28
On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette,'29 the
second circuit decided contrary to Gilday and Tucker. In this case,
petitioner Walker was serving a sentence of 15 to 35 years for a 1963
conviction of the crimes of rape, attempted robbery, grand larceny, and
possession and use of a dangerous weapon. Walker petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that he was denied a fair trial as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment when he was cross-examined about two prior
convictions in which he allegedly was without counsel.
At the 1963 trial, the defendant's credibility was of substantial im-
portance and his testimony was at direct variance to that of the pros-
ecution's chief witness. On direct examination, Walker stated that he had
never been convicted of a crime. On cross-examination, the prosecution
elicited from the petitioner that in fact he had previously been convicted of
possession of an unlicensed firearm and of disorderly conduct. The
second circuit allowing the admission of the evidence, based its decision,
by analogy, on decisions which have allowed the use of illegally obtained
evidence to contradict the defendant's testimony.30
In Harris v. New York,' for example, the prosecution was allowed to
use statements made by the defendant without benefit of the Miranda v.
Arizona32 warnings to impeach the defendant's credibility. The Court
said:
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1294.
29. 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971).
30. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954).
31. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.
38
The Court in Harris relied primarily on Walder v. United States.34  In
Walder, the defendant was arrested for sale of narcotics. When defendant
denied on direct examination that he had ever possessed narcotics, the
prosecution was permitted (for purposes of impeachment only) to prove
that defendant had previously possessed heroin. This heroin had been
obtained by government agents by means of an illegal search. The Court
stated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn
the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained
to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths.3 5
Viewing the Harris and Walder cases as favorable toward the disposition
of its case, the Follette court concluded:
It can make no difference that the constitutional infirmity in Harris and in Walder
was a violation of Miranda whereas here it was a violation of Gideon. The prin-
ciple is the same in either event. If a defendant testifies, he puts his credibility in
issue. If he lies in the course of his testimony, he lays himself open to attack by
means of illegal evidence which otherwise the prosecution could not use against
him.3S
Similar to the Gilday and Tucker courts, the majority of state courts
have held invalid the use of uncounseled prior convictions for impeachment
purposes. In Spaulding v. State,37 the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that the Burgett decision precludes the use of invalid convictions to im-
peach the defendant's testimony, stating:
While the states are free to provide such procedures as they choose in criminal cases,
including rules of evidence, they may not adhere to any procedure which violates
any of the guarantees of the United States Constitution. 38
In Johnson v. State,39 and In re Dabney,40 the Supreme Courts of both
Maryland and California held in accordance with Spaulding. Unlike
33. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
34. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
35. Id. at 65.
36. United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 443 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. 481 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1971).
38. Id. at 392.
39. 9 Md. App. 166, 263 A.2d 232 (1970).
40. 76 Cal. Rptr. 636, 452 P.2d 924 (1969). See also People v. Coffey, 60
Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967) (prior to Burgett); People v. Shook, 67 Ill. App.
2d 492, 214 N.E.2d 546, rev'd on other grounds, 35 Ill.2d 597, 221 N.E.2d 290
(1966) (prior to Burgett); Subilosky v. Commonwealth, 265 N.E.2d 80 (Mass.
1970).
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Spaulding, however, the courts in Johnson and In re Dabney decided that,
under the facts, the introduction of prior uncounseled convictions for
impeachment purposes did not require automatic reversal under the "harm-
less error" doctrine. 41
Contrary to Spaulding, Johnson and In re Dabney, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in Simmons v. State4 2 held valid the use of uncounseled
prior convictions to impeach a defendant's testimony. 43 The holding in
Simmons was seemingly limited to situations where the defendant, upon
taking the stand, specifically denied any prior convictions. Nevertheless,
the court stated that even if Burgett did apply in the case, under the facts, it
was harmless error and the result would be the same.
The Supreme Court in Loper dealt only with the aspect of Burgett which
barred the use of prior uncounseled convictions "to support guilt."
44
Specifically, Loper became the first Supreme Court case to decide the
question of whether the Burgett decision included within its scope the pro-
hibition of the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impeach the
defendant-witness' testimony. While the language of the ninth circuit in
Tucker v. United States45 was broad, 46 the Supreme Court in affirming
the decision 47 addressed itself only to that aspect of Burgett which pre-
cluded the admission of prior uncounseled convictions to "enhance punish-
ment," saying:
Erosion of the Gideon principle can be prevented here only by affirming the
judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the trial court for re-
consideration of the respondent's sentence. 4 8
Soon thereafter, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Loper
on the "impeachment" issue.49
In Loper, the Court noted that the case was not one where the prior
conviction was used for the purpose of directly rebutting a false statement
made from the witness stand50 as was the case in United States ex rel.
Walker v. Follette." The sole purpose for which the prior uncounseled
41. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Johnson, the court
remanded the case, and in In re Dabney, the court ordered a new trial.
42. 456 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
43. Id. at 68.
44. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 (1972).
45. 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. See supra n.26 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
48. Id. at 449.
49. 404U.S. 821 (1971).
50. 405 U.S. at 482 n.l 1.
51. 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
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convictions were used was to destroy Loper's credibility at the trial and
the Court proceeded on that basis. Concluding that the Burgett decision
was sound, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, stated:
Unless Burgett is to be forsaken, the conclusion is inescapable that the use of
convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach a
defendant's credibility deprives him of due process of law.52
The Court went on to adopt expressly the reasoning of Gilday v.
Scafati.53
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, said:
The rule implicit in the result reached by the Court today does violence both to
common sense and to society's interest in the finality of judgments. Only if trial
judges were soothsayers could they adhere to it. For under that rule, a prior con-
viction, admissible for impeachment purposes under state law and fully valid under
the Constitution as explicitly interpreted by this Court at the time the conviction
is sought to be introduced, becomes retroactively inadmissible if, years after the
trial, a decision of this Court renders that prior conviction constitutionally infirm
... . It is a distressing example of pressing the sound doctrine of retroactivity
beyond the outer limits of its logic. 54
To this effect, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
On the contrary, our decision in this case follows directly from the rationale under
which Gideon v. Wainwright ...was given retroactive application. . . It would
surely be unreasonable ...to have expected the judge at Gideon's trial to have
forseen our later decision in that case. But a necessary result of applying any
decision retroactively is to invalidate rulings made by trial judges which were cor-
rect under the law prevailing'at the time the judges made them.5 5
Finally, consideration must be given to the "harmless error" doctrine
of the Chapman decision. The Court in Loper noted that under the
circumstances of the case, there was "little room for a finding of harm-
(1971) and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Should such a distinction
make any significant difference? Why should a defendant-witness be expected to
disclose prior uncounseled convictions which have been held to "lack reliability,"
when any prior conviction will have at least some effect on the jury's determination
of guilt or innocence? This is not to say that the defendant should falsify informa-
tion concerning such prior convictions. Instead, it seems feasible that a pre-trial
determination could be made as to which, if any prior convictions are valid under
the Gideon principle. At the trial, then, the prosecution would be allowed to intro-
duce only those prior convictions held to be valid, and the defendant-witness would
not be put in a position of deciding whether or not to admit to the invalid convic-
tions.
52. 405 U.S. at 483.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 494. (Mr. Chief Justice Burger was referring to the fact that at
Loper's trial, under the doctrine of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), indigents
did not have a right to court-appointed counsel in state trial courts).
55. Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
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less error."5 6 It may be inferred from the Court's statement that the
use of uncounseled prior convictions for impeachment purposes is not a
per se violation calling for automatic reversal of a conviction; but, that
such use is to be subjected to a further "harmless error" test.
Under Chapman, "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.15 7  In Burgett, the Court stated: "The ad-
mission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under
the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial .... -58
This language has not been previously construed so as to impose a per se
violation requiring automatic reversal, 59 and the Court in Loper did not
directly address itself to that issue.
To the extent, then, that the decision in Loper is subject to possible
future circumvention by a finding of "harmless error," the decision leaves
open any inquiry into its prospective impact. Factors such as the number
of valid prior convictions, the defendant's own testimony, the testimony of
other witnesses, and other evidence tending to show the lack of de-
fendant's credibility will be of probative value in determining whether
the admission of invalid convictions is harmless.
Hopefully, if the "harmless error" test is to be the determinative focal
point as to the validity of the use of uncounseled prior covictions, it will
only be used in the most compelling and unavoidable situation.
To foster in the minds of jurors the notion that the defendant is falsify-
ing information, using only the rationale that the defendant has previously
committed a crime, is a harmful practice at best. Admittedly, the defen-
dant's credibility must be under the scrutiny of the jury simply because of
the person's status as the defendant. But a line of demarcation must be
drawn between legitimately questioning the credibility of a witness be-
cause the person is the defendant, and questioning the credibility of a
defendant because that person has previously been convicted of some of-
fense-and using that as the basis for attack.
56. 405 U.S. at 483 n.12.
57. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). But see Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), where the Chapman standard seems to have been
lessened to some degree. In Harrington, the Court allowed the use of "over-
whelming" untainted evidence to support a conviction although the tainted evidence
in question may have some influence on the conviction. Harrington v. California,
supra at 254.
58. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (emphasis added).
59. Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1970); Gilday v.
Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, 1030 (1st Cir. 1970); In re Dabney, 76 Cal. Rptr. 636,
639, 452 P.2d 924, 927 (1969); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 166, 175, 263 A.2d
232, 241 (1970).
19731 689
690 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
The social stigmatization of criminals is sufficiently overwhelming with-
out the need to perpetuate it in the courts. To say that the use of prior
uncounseled convictions for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's
testimony is "harmless error" is, at least to some degree, to say that the
evidence need not have been introduced in the first place. At least to
the extent that the prior conviction is without the benefit of counsel, the
determination of that fact could be resolved before the trial.
It goes without dispute that certain practices utilized in the past to
effect a conviction would hardly prevail under present standards. The
question then becomes whether a conviction obtained under one such
practice (i.e., where the defendant was not represented by counsel) should
ever be considered "harmless error."
Richard Wimmer
